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Property Insurance: A Call for Increased
Use of Examinations Under Oath for the
Detection and Deterrence of Fraudulent
Insurance Claims
In these trying times of exaggerated and intentionally false
claims, examinations under oath offer the insurance ,company's
best chance of aggressively investigating first party claims in a
good faith atmosphere. Examinations under oath should be effectively utilized by the insurance company in its search for
truth in the war against arson and false claims.'

I. Introduction
Insurance fraud lawsuits have reached staggering proportions in
the United States today. The American Insurance Industry Association has estimated that fifteen to twenty percent of all insurance
claims are fraudulent and that such claims cost policyholders $13.75
billion in premiums.2 Playing a major role in this disturbing trend
are fraudulent claims arising under fire or other types of property
insurance policies. 3 An insurance fraud lawsuit arises when an insurer denies coverage on the grounds that its insured fraudulently
procured the issuance of a policy or an event of a loss, had no loss at
all, or deliberately falsified a claim in some material way.4
1. Douglas G. Houser, Examinations Under Oath in First Party Arson Claims, 32
FED'N. INS. COUNS. Q. 211, 218 (1982).
2. N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 6, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
3. Joseph F. O'Dowd, Joining Forces in the Battle Against Arson, 91 BEST'S REV. 61,
62 (1991) ("Every year insurers pay $1.5 billion for claims that should be denied because of
arson."); see also W. Thompson Comerford, Jr., Property Insurance: Materialityand the Misrepresentation Defense, 54 DEFENSE COUNS. J. 312, 318 (1987) ("Arson for profit is at an
epidemic level in the United States.").
4. Michael S. Quinn, Closing Arguments in Insurance Fraud Cases, 23 TORT & INS.
L.J. 744, 745 (1988). The author also describes three types of property insurance fraud:
The first type of insurance fraud typically arises when an insured grossly exaggerates the value of property, knowingly fails to disclose material characteristics
of the property, insures property he does not own, knowingly fails to disclose new
hazards as they arise or increases in old ones, or lies about the uses of his property. Arson typifies the second type of property insurance fraud. The third type
of fraud involves any material lie in the claims process - whether about the loss
or about the damages. Such lies may occur anywhere in the claims process in
discussions of the claim, in the claim documents, in the proof of loss (if one is
required) or in the sworn statement.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The insurance company, however, possesses a valuable tool for
combatting false claims: the examination of the insured under oath.
Submitting insureds to examinations under oath, if used effectively,
is an "efficient device for expediting the evaluation, settlement or
adjustment of valid claims, and for detecting and discouraging improper or exaggerated claims." 5 Commentators have described such
examinations as the most important of the investigatory tools available to the insurer.' This Comment explores the nature of examinations under oath and current issues surrounding their use. Additionally, this Comment advocates increasing the use of examinations
under oath to further essential public policy goals.
Prior to analyzing specific issues arising from examinations
under oath, it is important to highlight the rights and responsibilities
of the insured and insurer before and during the examination process. This Comment first identifies important contractual rights and
suggests that the law affords substantial deference to insurers to establish and conduct examinations under oath to protect themselves
against fraudulent claims. 7 This Comment then analyzes several major controversies that arise when examinations under oath become
the focal point of litigation under the insurance policy."
The first analysis examines situations where the insurance policy
is silent regarding whether an insurer may conduct a single examination under oath when multiple insureds are involved.9 Conflicts arise
when the insureds insist that the insurer examine the policyholders
simultaneously. The Comment then analyzes the validity of insureds
asserting the Fifth Amendment before or during the examination
under oath. 10 The discussion concludes by focusing on the application of standard property insurance statutes and arson reporting laws
as justification for invoking the Fifth Amendment protection.1"
5. 2 STEPHEN A. COZEN, INSURING REAL PROPERTY § 22.01 (1989).
6. James L. Knoll, Examinations Under Oath: The Insurance Companies' Best Friend,
16 FORUM 777, 778 (1981-82).
7. See infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text.
8. Although examination under oath provisions are common in property insurance policies, the reader may note that many of the cases analyzed involve controversies arising under
fire insurance policies. This is because examinations under oath are frequently requested by
the insurer when there is suspicion of arson which may relate to the insured's claim under the
policy. The principles of law brought forth by an analysis of these controversies, however, can
be equally applied to all property insurance policies, including theft policies and homeowner
policies.
9. See infra notes 89-120 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 119-156 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 157-185 and accompanying text.

EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH

II.

Background

A.

Policy Provisions

Most property insurance policies contain a provision requiring
the insured to participate in an examination under oath if requested
by the insurance company.12 The examination addresses material information relevant to the circumstances surrounding the loss claimed
by the insured.1 3 A majority of the states1 4 require property insurance provisions identical, or similar to, the standard New York fire
policy which provides in part:
The insured, as often as may be required, shall exhibit to any
person designated by this company all that remains of any property herein described and submit to examinations under oath by
any person named by the company, and subscribe the same; and
as often as may be reasonably required, shall produce for examination all books of account, bills, invoices and other vouchers, or
certified copies thereof if originals be lost, as such reasonable
time and place as may be designated by the company or its representative and shall permit extracts and copies thereof to be
made.15
This type of provision is often referred to as part of a cooperation clause in the insurance policy, This clause requires that the insured cooperate with the insurer during the investigation of the insured's claim. This includes production of documents and books as
requested by the insurer."6 The scope of the cooperation, however,
frequently becomes the controlling issue when an insurer denies
recovery.
Simply stated, the examination under oath is "a contractual
right which the insurer has the option of exercising. 1 7 Examinations
under oath serve two useful purposes for insurance companies. First,
where legitimate disputes exist over the value of certain claims, the
insurer can obtain all pertinent information supporting the insured's
opinion of the value of damaged, destroyed or stolen property. This
12. 2 COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.01.
13. The definition of "materiality" of the questions that must be answered by the insured is discussed in further detail in the next section of this comment. See infra notes 56-72
and accompanying text.
14. Houser, supra note 1,at 211. As of 1982, "[tlhe statutory New York standard fire
policy, or its equivalent, is in use in approximately 40 states." Id.
15. COMM. PROP. INS. LAW, A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. COMPENSATION LAW, PROPERTY
INSURANCE ANNOTATIONS: FIRE AND EXTENDED COVERAGES 288 (1977).

16. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 783 ("A part of the insurer's right to demand an examination under oath is the right to demand the production of books and records.").
17. GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 49A:354 (1982).
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information includes the age of the items,, their condition and the
prior use of those items by the insured."8 Second, examination of an
insured is an effective means for discouraging and detecting fraudulent claims. 9 Perhaps the most widely cited explanation for the use
of examinations under oath was set forth by the United States Supreme Court a century ago:
The object of the provisions in the policies of insurance requiring
the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to
be reduced to writing, was to enable the company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and
means of knowledge, in regards to the facts, material to its
rights, to enable them to decide upon their obligations, and to
protect themselves against false claims.2"
Although the examination under oath manifests itself in a private contractual setting, in effect, it provides the insurance company
with a "free deposition." 2 Thus, the insurer may take advantage of
the coercive nature of this proceeding to facilitate the fact-finding
process involved in determining the validity of the claim.22 When an
insurance company demands that the insured submit to an examination, the insurer indicates dissatisfaction with the statement of proof
offered by the insured. "In such a case the insured has agreed his
conscience may be searched by questions put to him face to face,
where there is no opportunity for studied concealment". 2 3
B.

Examinations Under Oath Compared to Depositions

Although examinations under oath have been characterized as
depositions, 24 there remain critical differences between the two. "The
insured's obligation to submit to an examination under oath arises
18. Knoll, supra note 6, at 778.
19. Id.; see also Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir.
1984) ("the [examination's] purpose is to . . . enable the insurance company to acquire
knowledge or information that may aid it in its further investigation or that may otherwise be
significant to the company in determining its liability.
...
), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874
(1984); Hart v. Mechanics Traders Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 166, 169 (W.D. La. 1942) (the
principle object of the examination is to permit the insurer to determine whether it will pay or
contest the claim).
20. Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1884).
21. Houser, supra note 1,at 213.
22. "An insured who makes evasive or contradictory statements when not under oath
will be compelled, when later put under examination and held to the record of his answers, to
tell a consistent story or make himself ridiculous or possibly subject to prosecution for perjury
or for making false proofs of loss". PRENTISS B. REED, ADJUSTMENTS OF PROPERTY Loss 236
(2d ed. 1953).
23. Pearlstine v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 49 S.E. 4, 6 (S.C. 1904).
24. See supra note 15.

EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH

from contract rather than from the rules of civil procedure, and the
examination is usually taken before either party institutes litigation." 2 5 Thus, some courts have held that the right to examine under
the cooperation clause of the policy is much broader than the right
of discovery depositions under state civil procedure rules. 6
The standard New York fire insurance policy states that "any
person designated by the insurance company" can conduct an examination under oath." 7 While it is clear from this language that any
attorney authorized by the insurance company can administer an examination,26 it is also evident that an insurance investigator, claims
adjuster or any other authorized representative may conduct the

examination.29
Similar to a deposition, an examination under oath affords the
parties the right to have a court reporter present and a transcript
made of the examination. ° An insured's signature on the transcript,
however, may not be critical to an action on the policy. Courts have
from the exheld that the signing of the transcript, as distinguished
31
amination, was a purely "incidental matter.1
The insured may bring any person with him to assist at the examination under oath.3 2 The insured usually brings an attorney, if
anyone. 33 The scope of the assistance by the attorney, however, is
25. 2 COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.01.
26. Dyno-Bite, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., 439 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
(company's cooperation with insurer's demand for examination was not sufficient because some
officers had testified and agreed to further testify at a later date); see also Evans v. Int'l Ins.
Co., 562 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (scope of examination under the insurance
policy is broader than state discovery rules); Shelter v. Spence, 656 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983) ("Taking of a statement under the cooperation clause in an insurance policy does
not rise to the dignity of taking a deposition .
27. See supra note 15.
28. See American Macaroni Mfg Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 164 F.2d 878, 879 (5th
Cir. 1947).
29. It is important to note that an examination of the insured by the State Fire Marshall
does not satisfy the policy requirements for participation in a requested examination under
oath. See Mier v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 205 F. Supp. 108, 110 (W.D. La. 1962); cf.Boston
Ins. Co. v. Mars, 148 So.2d 718, 720 (Miss. 1963) (refusal of insured to submit to an examination under oath precluded recovery on the policy although a State Fire Marshall conducted
an earlier examination of the insured).
30. Compare COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.02(3) ("The right to have a court reporter can
be inferred from the standard policy language requiring the insured to submit to the examination under oath and 'subscribe the same' ") with FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) ("If requested, by one
of the parties the testimony shall be transcribed.").
31. Barbour v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 171 P. 1030, 1030 (Wash. 1918); see
also Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Iglehart, 386 P.2d 145, 147-48 (Okla. 1963) (insured's failure to
sign transcript is not a condition precedent to insured's action on denial of insurance proceeds).
32. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 780.
33. Courts have frequently upheld an insured's right to be represented by an attorney
during the examination under oath. A explanation for this right was articulated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma:
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limited. Unlike a discovery deposition, the insured's attorney is not
entitled to ask questions of the examinee or make objections on the
basis of local rules of civil procedure."a Also, the attorney does not
have the right to offer evidence on behalf of the insured.3 5 As discussed in Part III, infra, the examiner may question the witness regarding any material information as it pertains to the insured's
claim. Comparatively, the scope of a deposition is equally broad. 6
While depositions and examinations under oath share the common goal of facilitating the truth seeking process,3 7 an important distinguishing factor is that insurers conduct examinations prior to the
initiation of a lawsuit. An examination may provide an insurer with
convincing evidence of a fraudulent claim. This provides the insurer
with an enormous opportunity to discourage needless litigation or to
promote settlement. The costs of legal expenses for insurers have
grown dramatically due to inflation and increased litigation.3 a Thus,
providing the insurer with broad discretion in administering examinations under oath may indirectly serve public interests .by slowing
the rise in insurance costs.
III.

Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties

After a loss occurs, the insured is required to submit. a proof of
loss statement to the insurance company. After the statement is filed,
the insurer may further require the insured to submit to an examination under oath. The insurance company triggers the examination
process by issuing a formal demand to the insured requesting the
Special agents and insurance adjusters, who engage in settlement of insurance
losses, are skilled in their profession, and as a rule are familiar, in a degree at
least, with the law of insurance; their employment makes it their duty to represent, not the insured, but the insurer. It is therefore but just that the insured
should have the right to be represented by counsel when being examined under
oath, relative to the loss.
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Cargill, 145 P. 1134, 1137 (Okla. 1914).
34. 2 COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.01.
35. Humphrey v. National Fire Ins. Co., 231 S.W: 750, 755 (Tex. Com. App. 1921); see
also Knoll, supra note 6, at 780.
36. "It is not grounds for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at
the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
37. PAUL M. LISNEK & MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, DEPOSITIONS: PROCEDURE, STRATEGY
AND TECHNIQUE, § 1.2 (1990) ("During a deposition the attorney can confirm the details of
the deponent's story with previous statements made by or records of that deponent or other
documents relating to that deponent's story.").
38. James Howland & Michael Pritula, Legal Costs: Can the Flow be Slowed?, 91
BEST'S REV. 14 (1991). The authors remark that "[t]he surge in legal costs have been staggering for carriers. In the past decade, the amount of money insurers have spent on legal expenses
has more than quadrupled, skyrocketing from $2.8 billion in 1978 to $11.8 billion in 1988, an
annual growth rate over 15%." Id.

EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH

policyholder's presence at an examination under oath. This demand
is necessary before an insurer can contend that an insured failed to
submit to an examination or refused to furnish the documents requested.3 9 The demand must expressly state the time and place for
the examination and the person before whom it should take place.4 0
At least one court has held, however, that the insurer has no duty to
articulate a reasonable basis for its request for an examination under
oath."' The sufficiency of the demand is premised upon the specifications of the policy as well as the content of the written demand itself,
which must be clear and unambiguous in its terms.4 2 For example, in
Brookins v. State Fire and Casualty Co." the court held that an
insurer's demand letter which failed to designate the person to take
the examination or the time and place thereof was not a sufficient
demand."
Courts have held that a sufficient demand must also schedule
the examination under oath within a reasonable time after the loss
and the submission of proof after loss. 4' For example, a Federal Dis-

trict Court in South Carolina held that an insurer was not entitled to
examine the insured under oath two days before the trial regarding
recovery under the policy." Additionally, in Beckley v. Otsego
39. Nicolai v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 378 P.2d 287, 288 (Wash. 1963) (there are
numerous cases which hold that a demand is a prerequisite for an examination under the
provision of the policy upon which the insurance company relies); see also Bergeron v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 2 P.2d 453, 455 (Cal. App. 1931); Sexton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 7
Tenn. App. 273, 277 (1928); Humphrey v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 231 S.W. 750, 754-755 (Tex.
Com. App. 1921); R.Y. Liang, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Insurer's Demand
Under Fire Policy,for Examination of Insured or His Books or Papers, orfor Proofs of Loss,
Certificates, or Sworn Statements. 4 ALR 3d 631 (1965).
40. Saft Am., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 271 S.E.2d 641, 642 (Ga. App. 1980);
Citizens Ins. Co. v. Herpolsheimer, 109 N.W. 160, 164 (Neb. 1906). Nicolai v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 379 P.2d 287, 288 (Wash. 1963). But see Bergeron v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 2
P.2d 453, 455 (Cal. App. 1931) (holding that a demand for examination was sufficient under
the policy, although it did not specify the person before whom the examination would be held).
41. Muhammad v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 972 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1992).
42. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a notice stating, "it is the
company's desire to conduct an examination under oath" was not a sufficient demand that the
insured submit to an examination, because the notice was not in literal compliance with the
policy provision. Davidson v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 157 A. 148, 149 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1931).
43. 529 F. Supp. 386, 392 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
44. The Brookins decision was also cited with approval by the court in Higgins v. Hartford Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 38, 42 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
45. 5A JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, § 3551 (1970); see also
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 69 N.W. 125 (Neb. 1896); Beckley v. Otsego County Farmers Coop Fire Ins. Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 270, 275 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 143 N.E.2d 340
(N.Y. 1957).
46. Crowley v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 70 F. Supp. 547, 552 (W.D.S.C.),
aff'd, 164 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1947).
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County Farmers Co-op Fire Ins. Co."' the court held that whether a
demand for an examination was void due to the lateness of the request was a question for the jury.4 8 The demand was made almost
four months after the filing of the proofs of loss and after a lawsuit
had been commenced against one of the insurance companies.4 9
The insurance company should also be aware that notice of demand should be given to the insured, as well as to the insured's attorney. 50 "This stems from the nature of the policy as a contract of
insurance between the insurer and the insured, notwithstanding the
well-established rule that notice to an attorney is imputed as notice
to his client.'
Normally, the examination under oath should be taken in the
county where the loss occurred. 51 In circumstances in which there is
a dispute as to location of an examination, courts have held that
neither party has the right to insist that the examination under oath
be held ,elsewhere. 53 Some courts have held that insurers may conduct an examination at a location other than where the loss occurred
if a policy provision gives the insurance company the right to designate the time and place and if such designation is reasonable. 5' This
signifies the importance courts have placed on the contract language
governing the rights and duties of the parties. As may be expected,
however, the "reasonableness" in the location may require an insurance company to abide by the insured's choice of location in extreme
circumstances. For example, if the insured is in a hospital or a penitentiary, it would be impracticable and unduly burdensome to hold
47. 159 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1957), appeal dismissed, 143 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1957).
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 69 N.W. 125, 128-29 (Neb. 1896) (an
insurer's demand for an examination 60 days following the loss was not sufficient under the
policy). But see Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co. v. N.Y. Property Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 428 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), afd, 422 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1981) (an
insured who willfully refused to submit to an examination under oath could not recover in an
action on the fire policy even though insurer's demand came ten months after the loss).
50. Weber v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 462 N.E.2d 422, 424
(Ohio App. 1983) ("Because the insurance policy sub judice is in reality a contact running
between [insurer] and [insured], fairness requires that notice be given, as a matter of course,
to [insured] himself, as well as his attorney.")(emphasis in original).
51. Id.
52. Pierce v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 182 P. 586, 587 (Wash. 1919).
53. See Knoll, supra note 13 at 780.
54. Ayuob v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp 713, 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The court relied on the language of the policy which stated that the "insured shall
appear at such reasonable time and place designated by the insurer." Id. This language enabled the court to distinguish its holding from Pierce v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 182 P.
586 (Wash. 1919), which involved a policy which was silent concerning the location of an
examination. Id.

EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH

the examination elsewhere. 55
Generally, the only limit on the insurance company's right to
obtain information is a test of "materiality" of the question asked.56
Scholars have defined the test for materiality as "all matters having
a bearing on the insurance and the loss." '57 Information that courts
have held germane to fire claims include: the insured's financial position,58 income tax records,5 9 prior fire insurance claims, 0 financial
gain,6 1 prior criminal record62 and the location of the insured at the
time of the loss. 3 Similarly, in theft loss claims, courts have upheld
55. See 2 COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.03[1][c].
56. Passero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 554 N.E.2d 384, 386-87 (IlI. App. Ct. 1990).
57. 5A APPLEMAN, supra note 45, § 3552; see also Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins.
Co., 725 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The materiality requirement is satisfied if the questions concern a subject relevant and germane to the insurer's investigation."); Gipps Brewing
Corp. v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 147 F.2d 6, 13 (7th Cir. 1945); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
58. Pisa v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 966 F.2d 1440 (1st Cir. 1992) (insurer's demand for
insured's checkbook and authorization to obtain tax returns were relevant and reasonable);
Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141, 149 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (material questions concerned whether the insured had income tax problems with the government), aff'd, 416
F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969); Payne v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.; 456 So.2d 34, 37 (Ala. 1984)
(insured refused to supply her bank accounts, name her accountant or partners in her business);Southern Guar. Ins. Co. V. Dean, 172 So.2d 553, 556 (Miss. 1965) (insured declined to
obtain copies of canceled checks or income tax returns and refused to provide the insurer with
authorization to examine her checking accounts in banks in which she deposited and withdrew
personal and business funds).
59. McIntosh v. Eagle Fire Co., 325 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1963). The case involved the
admissibility of an insured's tax records for three years preceding a fire on the insured's property. The insured objected on grounds the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial since
it was already shown that the policyholder was previously convicted of income tax fraud. Id.
The court held that the evidence was admissible because motive was deemed an issue in the
crime of incidiarism. Id. Cf. Hines v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 815 F.2d 648, 652
(11 th Cir. 1987) (an authorized document, signed by the insured, which allowed the insurer to
obtain copies of the insured's income tax returns directly from the IRS created a jury question
as to whether the document production order was satisfied).
60. Kiddie v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 601 P.2d 740, 742 (Okla. 1979). For a
discussion pertaining to the use by insurers of an insured's prior claims to help establish an
arson defense, see Dungan B. Cooper, Arson - Relevancy of Prior Claims, 54 INS. COUNS.J.
178 (1984).
61. Kisting, 290 F. Supp. at 149. See generally Meyers v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co., 801 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (where an insurer alleges arson as a defense to a claim
for fire loss, the financial status and potential financial gain to the insured are material to that
defense); Chavis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 338 S.E.2d 787, 789 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986) (examination under oath provisions do not give the insurer license to harass the insured
with aimless questions and demands for documents, although this was not the situation at the
case at bar), rev'd on other grounds, 346 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
62. Mulkey v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 132 S.E.2d 278, 284 (S.C. 1963).
63. Edmiston v. Schellenger, 343 So.2d 465, 467 (Miss. 1977). The court, after noting
that it takes a broad view of the "materiality" of questions asked by the examiner, asserted
that inquiries concerning the policyholder's activities on the day of the fire were most material
because of the insurance company's need to determine the actual cause of the fire. Id. Additionally, questions concerning whether the insured had any out-of-town visitors during the two
weeks prior to the fire were also material since the insurer had a right to try to interview any
persons who might have knowledge of the fire. Id.
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the materiality of questions pertaining to the source of the purchase
money, 64 financial status,6 5 bank statements60 and prior claims submitted to the insurance company. 7 Other matters generally considered personal, such as church contributions and prior marriages,
have also been held relevant to an insurer's inquiry. 68
Whether particular information is material to an insurance
claim varies depending on the individual circumstances. One judicial
scholar has asserted that "the guiding principle should be whether
the information can, in any conceivable way, aid the insurer in determining the true cause or extent of the loss and the credibility of the
insured." 69 In its desire to deter and detect fraudulent claims, the
insurance company should be afforded substantial deference in the
type of questions it may ask. A question that is controversial or an
answer that may later be used for impeachment does not render the
question improper.70 The insurer has a right to conduct a complete
investigation and to expect full compliance by the insured. "Just as
the insured is entitled to rely upon a prompt investigation and honest
adjustment of his claim, the insurer should
expect the utmost in good
1
faith and honesty from the insured."'
While the power and scope of the insurer's rights are extensive,
courts have refused to recognize that the policy requirement compelling an insured to submit to an examination under oath is broad
enough to require the policyholder to submit to a polygraph examination.7 2 In Mize v. Hartford Ins. Co.,73 the insurance company issued an ultimatum to the policyholder to submit to a polygraph test
64. Dadurian v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 787 F.2d 756, 759-61 (1st Cir.
1986) (the source of large amounts of cash which was used for the purchase of jewelry was
material to an insured's claim for theft under the policy).
65. Maurice v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("Here,
where there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the burglary of the [insured's] home,
the [insured's] possible motive in arranging the burglary renders their financial situation material and relevant.").
66. Williams v. American Home Assurance Co., 468 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983), affd, 468 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1984).
67. Rickert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (inability of insured to recollect recent insurance loss claims involving substantial amounts of money
were clearly material to insurer's investigation of claim), appeal denied, 557 N.E.2d 114
(N.Y. 1990).
68. Gates v. States Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (S.D. Miss. 1990),
a.'d 928 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
69. 2 COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.02[5].
70. See Knoll, supra note 6 at 785.
71. W. Thompson Comerford, Jr., Property Insurance: Materiality and the Misrepresentation Defense, 54 DEF. Co Ns. J. 312, 318 (1987).
72. ALAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 107 (2d ed. 1988).
73. 567 F. Supp 550 (W.D. Va. 1982).
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administered by the State Police or it would not pay the claim. 74 The
court found that the insurer acted in willful disregard of the insured's rights.75 Furthermore, even if the insured voluntarily submits

to a polygraph examination, most courts do not allow an insurer to
7

use the results of the test to justify denying a policyholder's claim. 1
In states which recognize the validity of polygraph tests, the results
from these tests are helpful in determining whether an insured's
claim is fraudulent.
The failure of an insured to submit to an examination under
oath or a refusal to answer certain questions during the examination
inevitably results in adverse consequences to the insured and subsequent litigation involving responsibilities under the policy. For instance, in most insurance policies, failure of an insured to submit to
an examination is a material breach of the policy which relieves the
insurer of its contractual duty to pay.77 In other words, submitting to
an examination is considered a condition precedent to recovery. 78
Some courts, however, view compliance with an examination
under oath clause as a condition precedent to recovery only if it 7is9
expressly stated in the policy or is clearly implied by the language.
74. Id. at 555.
75. Id. at 555; see also Walker v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 103,
105 (Tenn. App. 1977). The Walker court ruled that the policy words, which state that the
insured shall "submit to eiaminations under oath by anyone designated by the company, subscribe the same," cannot be construed as language which would require submission to a polygraph examination. Id.
76. Memphis Bank and Trust Co. v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 395,
397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (since polygraph evidence has been recognized as unreliable as a
matter of state law, courts may not permit the introduction of polygraph evidence as the sole
basis for determining whether the insurer acted in good faith in denying the insured's claim);
cf. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 531-32 (Wash. 1990) (evidence of insured's refusal to submit to a polygraph test is inadmissible to show insurer's justification for
denying the claim).
77. Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 452 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); see
also Pervis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944, 948 (11 th Cir.), cert denied,
Il1 S.Ct. 225 (1990); Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811, 815 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Robinson v. Nat'l Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 282 P.2d 930, 934
(Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Watson v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 468 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1991); Boston
Ins. Co. v. Mars, 148 So.2d 718, 719-20 (Miss. 1963).
78. Stover v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 658 F. Supp. 156, 160 (S.D.W.Va. 1987).
One court, however, has ruled: "Of course where it is impossible for the insured to comply
with this condition or where circumstances are such, through no fault of the insured, that he
cannot submit to the examination, his failure to do so will not operate to forfeit the policy."
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims, 42 S.E. 269, 270 (Ga. 1902); see also Roberto v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 1949) (since insured had been deported and was
unable to return for an examination, the insured was relieved of his duty to appear); Blackburn v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 329 S.E.2d 284, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (insured's
poor health can excuse failure to submit to an examination).
79. Morgan v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 179 P. 330, 331 (Kan. 1919). Cf. Home Ins. Co.
v. Balfour-Guthrie Ins. Co., 476 P.2d 533, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (policy does not require
the insured to cooperate in litigation and submit to the taking of his deposition upon penalty of
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Furthermore, a refusal to submit to an examination only affects the
named insureds on the policy.8 0 Multiple insureds' rights are considered individually when one refuses to submit to an examination

under oath.8"
Although most courts may regard compliance by the insured to
be necessary to maintain a suit upon the insurance policy, there is a
split of authority regarding the effect non-compliance has on the insurance policy itself. Some courts hold that failure to submit to an
examination would not work a forfeiture of such policy, but would
merely require the abatement of an action brought thereon.82 Other
courts have held that an insured's refusal represents a material
83
breach, thus constituting a forfeiture of all rights under the policy.
In some cases the insured will attend the examination at the
request of the insurance company, but refuse to answer certain questions. In these situations it has been held that there is a breach of
the policy if an insured refuses to answer material questions, unless
some principal excuses the insured's failure to furnish the information. 8 For example, the insured is not required to answer questions
that are clearly irrelevant to the disposition of the insured's claim. 85
forfeiting his indemnification protection under the policy), appeal dismissed, 486 P.2d 778
(Ariz. 1971).
80. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Miceli, 518 N.E.2d 357, 363 (I11.Ct. App.
1987) (under homeowner's policy requiring insured to submit to examinations under oath, the
court held that only insureds were under obligation to submit to such examination; their children were under no such obligation, even though coverage extended to them), appeal denied,
522 N.E.2d 1257 (I11.1988).
81. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 349 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Ga. Ct. App.
1986) (a refusal by insured's husband to submit to an examination under oath did not operate
to prevent insured from recovering for the loss of her property from the fire; it merely prevented the husband from recovering benefits for any loss he might have suffered as a result of
the fire); accord Morris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 287 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)
(upon choosing to invoke coverage, an additional insured is bound by the terms of the policy
and any restrictions imposed by the policy terms).
82. Simonetti v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 726, 729 (N.D. Ala. 1947). But see
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wigginton, 964 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Mississippi law
is clear that a policy is rendered void when an insured . . . fails to submit to an examination
under oath."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (an
insured's refusal to submit to an examination under oath is a material breach of the insurance
contract and results in a total forfeiture of all rights under the policy). Cf. McCullough v.
Travelers Co., 424 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. 1988) (the failure to submit to an examination is
not fatal to the insureds suit where the insured did not expressly refuse to an examination and
expressed a willingness to be examined shortly after commencing suit).
83. Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141, 147 (W.D. Wis. 1968);
Warrilow v. Superior Court of Arizona, 689 P.2d 193, 198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). But cf
Pickwick Park Ltd. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 602 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1992) (an insurer must
show that it has been prejudiced before the insured's failure to comply with a policy's procedural requirements will bar recovery).
84. Halcome v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 334 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Ga. 1985).
85. Broderson v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 174 A. 719 (N.J. 1934) (the refusal of the insured
to answer any immaterial question of his inability to provide an answer or information to a

EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH

Generally, the issue surrounds the relevancy or the materiality of the
unanswered question.8 6

It is advantageous for an insurer to have a complete understanding of the rights and responsibilities of each party before and during
an examination under oath. The preceding analysis, however, does
not include or address all rights under examination under oath
clauses. Because of the complexity of the proceedings, the insurer's
attorney should give the required notice for an examination and
should conduct the examination. 87 The attorney, rather than an insurance adjuster or representative, is in the best position to ensure
that the insurance company follows necessary procedures. Proper
conduct during examinations under oath eliminates the need to insist
on further examinations of the insured8 8 and could avoid needless
litigation. As illustrated by the next section, however, there are still
unavoidable conflicts which arise during examinations under oath.
IV.
A.

Current Controversies
Separate Examinations Under Oath For Multiple Insureds

An insurer may examine all persons who are named as insureds
in the insurance policy.89 Because the language of insurance contracts varies, it is important for the insured and the insurer to examine the policy carefully to determine whose examination under
oath the policy expressly authorizes. 90 Conflicts arise when policies
material question will not preclude recovery).
86. Hines v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 815 F.2d 648, 652 (11th Cir. 1987) (if
there was a finding that the insurer's questions were "material" and also there was no evidence
of sufficient justification for refusing to answer these questions then the insured is barred from
recovery on the claim).
87. Many examinations use to be conducted by adjusters. One author offers the following reasoning for attorney involvement in examinations, "[I]n recent years examinations have
more and more often been referred to lawyers because of their greater experience in questioning witnesses." REED, supra note 22, at 235.
88. Under most insurance policies, more than one examination under oath may be administered to an individual insured. See COZEN, supra note 5, § 22.03 [8] (citing Catalogue
Service of Westchester, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) and Bonner v. Home Ins. Co., 13 Wis. 758, 770 (Wis. 1861)) ("Most property insurance policies in use today . . .provide for "examinations" as opposed to an "examination"
under oath. Where this policy language is employed, an insurer will generally be entitled to
examine an insured more than once."). But see WILLIAM H. RHODA, FIRE AND PROPERTY
INSURANCE, 111 (1956) where the author states that it may be difficult to conduct more than
one examination even though the word "examinations" is used in the insurance policy. The
author suggests that it is imperative that the examiner prepare his questions carefully so that
additional examinations will not be necessary.
89. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 780.
90. As a general rule, however, independent contractors cannot be required to submit to
an examination under oath. See Palace Cafe v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 97 F.2d 766, 768-69
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938) (a policy which provided for examination of the
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involving multiple insured are silent concerning procedural guidelines. If the insureds insist on being examined together, must the
insurer concede to the policyholder's wishes and examine the insureds simultaneously? Furthermore, does failure of the insureds to
comply with the insurer's demands violate the cooperation clause of
the policy?
The courts have not provided clear answers to these questions.9"
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tan,92 Bruce Tan and Rosemarie Tan were the insureds on a homeowners insurance policy containing a cooperation clause conferring on the insurer the right to
examine the Tans regarding their claims.9" When the Tans submitted two claims for theft loss, State Farm sought to examine them
separately to resolve its suspicions of possible fraud.94 The Tans insisted that any questions asked by the examiner be made while both
insureds were present. 5 State Farm refused the Tans' request and
both examinations were never completed.' Subsequently, State
Farm brought a declaratory relief action. The United States District
Court ruled that the cooperation clause permitted the insurer to con97
duct separate examinations.
The Tan court, citing an earlier Tennessee case,98 held that
where the cooperation clause fails to fully elaborate on the details
surrounding the examination, the court "has a duty to interpret the
clause reasonably so as to effectuate the party's intention." 99 Emphasizing that examinations under oath enhance the truth-finding process, 10 the court concluded that separate examinations would provide a reasonable means to discover the truth while causing no
insured could bind only its corporate agents and not an independent contractor or attorney).
91. See Richard A. Buchanan, Property Insurance Law: Annual Survey of Developments, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 456, 459 (1989).
92. 691 F. Supp. 1271 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
93. Id. at 1272.
94. Id.
95. Rosemarie Tan was examined on the scheduled day of the examination. The following day the parties reconvened with Bruce Tan and Rosemarie Tan present. State Farm requested that Rosemarie Tan leave the room, but she refused. Id. at 1273.
96. Id.
97. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tan, 691 F; Supp. 1271, 1272 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
98. Shelter Ins. Co. v. Spence, 656 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (an insurer has
a right under the policy's cooperation clause to examine separately each of the two insureds
making the claim).
99. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tan, 691 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (S.D. Cal.
1988).
100. "'At the very least, separate examinations could lead to a recount of facts as the
individual insured remembers them, and circumvents the possibility that the insured's recollection of events will be subconsciously altered because of suggestion from prior testimony.' " Id.
at 1273 (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hill, 722 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (Manford, J., dissenting)).
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inconvenience to the insureds.''
Directly conflicting with the Tan court decision is United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Welch.' A fire destroyed the Welchs'
home' 0 3 which was covered under a fire insurance policy administered by the insurer.'0 4 Suspecting arson, the insurer advised the
Welchs that it would conduct examinations under oath of both the
husband and wife.' 0 5 The examinations never took place because the
insurance company insisted upon examining each of the insured separately, but the Welchs refused to be examined unless they both
would be present.' 0 6 The court held that since the policy did not contain a separate examination under oath provision,0 7 the insurer was
not entitled to conduct examinations individually.1
According to the Welch court, a ruling that the examination
under oath clause implicitly provides for separate examinations presupposes that the policy would not be complied with if examinations
were administered together. 08 The court urges legal practitioners to
consider that the policy is adhered to when the insureds' examinations are administered simultaneously:
This provision would be fully complied with if each appellee in
the presence of his or her spouse gave answers to the questions
propounded on behalf of the company, and signed and swore to
his or her answers so given. Appellant would have received such
answers, in complete compliance with the cooperation clause if it
had not insisted upon receiving more than it was entitled to
under the clause.' 09
Although not expressly stated, the Welch court appeared to be
fearful of rewriting provisions in insurance contracts." Other courts
have shared the concerns enunciated in Welch. In a similar case the
Missouri Appellate Court stated, "[t]he only way this court could
101. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tan, 691 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (S.D. Cal.
1988).
102. 854 F.2d 459 (1lth Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 460.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Welch, 854 F.2d 459, 460 (11 th Cir. 1988).
107. Id. at 461. The court held that under the policy the insureds' obligation is simply to
submit to questions under oath and to sign and swear to them, which the insureds were willing
to do, albeit separately. Id.
108. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Welch, 854 F.2d 459, 461 (1lth Cir.
1988).
109. Id.
110. The Welch court noted that "the insurer is obviously responsible for any defective
draftsmanship and the policyholder should not suffer disadvantage therefrom." Welch, 854
F.2d at 461 n.4.
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reach the result requested by [the insurer] would be to rewrite the
policy and add provisions which are not now there nor which are
contended to be contained by a reasonable construction of the language employed.""'". To bolster this argument, courts note that it has
traditionally been held that insurance policies written by the insurer
are to be construed more favorably on the side of the insured."'
The district court in Tan appears to embrace a judicial philosophy that accepts court interaction when contract provisions are silent. The court distanced itself from contrary rulings by asserting
that the allowance of separate examinations under oath would not
"comport with the exigencies of reality nor the laws of California.""' The Tan court further interjects, "[n]o contract can anticipate every contingency. Inevitably, a court will be called on to adju4
dicate an issue that the contracting parties failed to address."'"
Furthermore, supporters of separate examinations under oath point
out that this procedure will not infringe upon the rights of the insured. Courts stress that the constricting notice requirements of a
demand to examine, the fact that the insured's attorney may be present during the examination," 5 and the requirement that the insured
signs the statement for the record' 1 6 all assure that the rights of the
insured will remain protected.
This reasoning directly comports with the purpose and intended
results of the examination under oath. Individual examinations
greatly enhance the insurer's ability to discover facts and assess the
validity of the claim." 7 Allowing insureds to be examined together
111. United States Fidelity & Guar.- Co. v. Hill, 722 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986). The court expressly claimed that the Spence Court rewrote the policy. Id. at 610.
112. Welch, 854 F.2d at 461 (citing Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Shotts, 103
So.2d 181, 182 (Ala. 1957)).
113. State Farm Fire &'Casualty Co. v. Tan, 691 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (S.D. Cal.
1988).
114. Id. See also the dissenting opinion in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hill,
722 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), in which Justice Manford remarks that the present
case is not one in which the court is being asked to formulate the agreement, but rather, there
is no wording in the cooperation clause of the policy which expressly prohibits examinations
from being conducted separately.
115. See Gordon v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 163 N.W. 956, 957 (Mich. 1917)
(insured has no reasonable objection to a bonafide request that the examination be conducted
in the presence of the insured's attorney).
116. See Hart v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 166, 169 (W.D. La. 1942).
117. The reasons for separate examinations of multiple insureds is analogous to the sequestration of witnesses during trial proceedings:
[Separation of one party's witnesses] . . . deprives the later witness the opportunity of shaping his testimony to correspond with that of the earlier one. But it is,
additionally, detective in its effect; ie., it exposes their difference of statement on
points which, had they truly spoken, they must have made identical statements.
This variance of statements is the significant achievement of the witnesses' sepa-
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hinders the fact-finding process by allowing the insureds to possibly
influence each other's testimony. Additionally, examiners would be
unable to solicit separate testimonies that may otherwise prove contradictory.118 Thus, the courts should recognize that separate examinations under oath do not infringe upon an insured's rights while
furthering important public interests by minimizing fraudulent
testimony.11 9
Of course, controversies surrounding separate examinations
under oath would not arise if the policy expressly provided for an
individual examination because the language of the contract would
prevail.' 2 0 Absent clear wording within the policy, it appears that the
jurisdiction of the overseeing court and the exact language of the
insurance policy are important factors dictating whether courts will
permit separate examinations under oath. Courts should recognize,
however, that separate examinations do not fall outside the scope of
cooperation clauses.
B.

Fifth Amendment Considerations

Mary Restina leased and operated a store named "Lady Duff
Shop."' 21 Restina obtained an insurance policy from the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company which provided for insurance coverage
for losses sustained by fire and other hazards. 2 2 As a result of a fire,
Restina sought to recover damages totalling $65,O000.00.12 Approximately one month after the fire, a Grand Jury returned a three count
indictment charging Restina with malicious injury to property and

arson.124
Subsequently, Aetna served a demand for Restina to submit to
an examination under oath. 125 Restina's attorney advised Aetna that
she would not submit to an examination due to the outstanding crimration ....
6 JOHN H..WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1838, at 463 (3d ed. 1940).

118. Id. ("The expedient of sequestration (next to cross examination) is one of the
greatest engines that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of liars ....").
119. See Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Spence, 656 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
120. "It is beyond argument that if the language of an insurance policy is clear and
unambiguous then a court does not have to rewrite the policy, but must construe it as written".
Madison Block Pharmacy Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. 620 S.W.2d 343, 346
(Mo. 1981).
121. Restina v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969).
122. Id. at 220.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Restina v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969).
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inal indictment. 2 6 Aetna's counsel responded by insisting that
R'estina's refusal to submit to the examination would result in the
rejection of any claims under the policy. 12 7 Ms. Restina was ultimately acquitted of all charges set forth in the indictment and her
attorney advised Aetna that she was now available for examination.12 8 Aetna did not reschedule the examination and refused to
honor her claim. 12 9 Restina brought suit to recover for fire loss.
The Restina scenario represents a developing controversy over
the scope of examinations under oath and the insured's responsibility
to submit to an examination where there is an ongoing criminal investigation or pending criminal trial against the insured. The courts
must address competing interests of the policyholder and the insurance company. It is in the insured's best interest not to answer any
questions and the insured might refuse to answer under a claim of
constitutional right. The insurer asserts that a non-compliant insured
breaches the cooperation clause of the policy and, therefore, it has
the right to deny any claim the policyholder might assert. Analysis
of these competing interests reveals that the privilege against self
incrimination should not extend to examinations arising solely from
insurance policies.
The Restina court noted that the only possible basis for
Restina's refusal to submit to an examination was her fear of testifying under oath when such testimony could possibly be used against
her in the prosecution of the pending criminal charges.1 3 Since the
issue was one of first impression in New York, the court adopted the
legal reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court of California in
Hickman v. London Assurance Corp."'1 In part, the Restina court
126. In a letter to Aetna, Ms. Restina's attorney expressed his client's position regarding
the examination:
In response to your recent letter addressed to Mrs. Mary Restina, relative to the
above captioned loss, please be advised that as I have told you over the phone
and I repeat, I cannot have Mrs. Restina subject to an examination under oath
at this time, since she is presently under indictment.
As soon as this matter is disposed of I will be glad to have Mrs. Restina submit
to the requested examination.
Id. at 221.
127. The policy in question was in the standard form required by New York and contained, in part, the following: "The insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall ...
Id. at 220.
submit to examinations under oath by any person named by this Company .
128. Id. at 221.
129. Id.
130. Restina v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 219, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969). The court further noted that the plaintiff was attempting to apply her constitutional
right against self-incrimination; therefore that exercise was sufficient justification which excused her breach of the terms of the insurance contract. Id.
131. 195 P. 45 (Cal. 1920).
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cited with approval the conclusion set forth in Hickman: "Constitutional immunity from self-incrimination did not absolve an insured
from complying with the provisions of an insurance contract . . .
even though the insured is at the time under indictment for arson for
the burning of the property in question."'3 2 Although Restina was
acquitted of all criminal charges, her initial refusal to submit to an
examination under oath for constitutional reasons was faulty, thus
precluding recovery on her $65,000 claim for fire damages.
It is apparent that circumstances such as those outlined in
Restina place the insured in a difficult situation. To combat this
problem, insureds have contended that they may invoke Fifth
Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination because the examination answers may be used against them at a criminal trial. One
court stated this contention as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that since he stands accused of the crimes of

arson, forgery and other crimes in connection with the claim, he
could not very well submit to an examination under oath by the
attorneys for the defendant who are [his] accusers under cir-

cumstances tantamount to a star chamber inquisition without
33
any safeguards with respect to [his] constitutional rights.'
However, it is true that if the insurer suspects fraud, the examiner
may pressure the insured to answer difficult or uncomfortable questions. 34 Notwithstanding this apparent "Catch 22" in which policyholders finds themselves, the majority of courts favor insurance companies in disputes involving the attempted invocation of Fifth
Amendment rights by insureds.
A factor which gives great credence to the insurer's position is
the insurance policy itself. The United States Supreme Court has
held, "[b]y the terms of the contract [the insured] was bound to
answer truly every question put to him that was relevant to that inquiry. ' "Ia Additionally, the Hickman court noted, "It may be conceded that the position in which [the insured] found himself...
was one of difficulty, but it was a difficulty created by the contract
he made.'

3

In a typical property insurance contract the insured

132. Restina, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (citing Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 195 P.
45 (Cal. 1920)). The Restina court further stated that the insured's refusal to submit to such
examination on these grounds constituted a breach of the contract and deprives the insured of
any claim or cause of action against the insurer on the insurance contract. Id.
133. Gross v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 337 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
134. REED, supra note 22, at 236.
135. Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 96 (1884).
136. Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 159 P. 45, 49 (Cal. 1920). The court also
stated that mere hardship or difficulty will not excuse a party from carrying out a contract.

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

agrees to cooperate with the insurer as a condition precedent to performance of the promise to indemnify. 1 37 Any difficulty experienced
by the insured is a result of the circumstances surrounding the loss,
not of deliberate actions by the insurer.' 3 8 Depriving the insurer of
essential information is detrimental to the claims process. The insurer can not make an educated evaluation of an insured's claim
without having the opportunity to conduct a thorough examination
of the insured.
In many cases where the issue before the court involves the
question of Fifth Amendment rights, the policyholder has argued
that he or she would be willing to submit to an examination under
oath upon resolution of any criminal proceedings. 3 9 Thus, the insured claims that where there is a justified right to invoke Fifth
Amendment protections, the insured's claim should not be denied.
According to the insured, this position is justified because the policyholder reasonably cooperated by answering certain questions and
asking to forgo responding to other questions until a later date.
Courts, however, have also been rejecting this rationale. The
Restina court asserted: "[tlhe plaintiff's willingness to submit to
such examination at a later date does not change the indisputable
fact that plaintiff refused to submit to an examination under
oath.""10 Similarly, the New York Superior Court has held that an
insured's "obligation of cooperation is not met by . . . partial testimony . . . or by promises of evidence to be supplied at some indefinite future when the criminal proceedings are concluded."'' While
Id.; see also Saucier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 765 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D. Miss.
1991) ("It is equally clear that the unfortunate fact of [insured's] indictment did not relieve
her of her contractual obligations.").
137. "A fire insurance policy is nothing more than a contract by the insurer to indemnify the insured against a property loss which it has sustained." Dyno-Bite, Inc. v. Travelers
Cos., 439 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); see also Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd,
452 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (fact that the insured may be concerned about a
pending arson investigation does not in any way excuse the insured from performing an insurance policy requirement).
138. Carleton R. Hoy, Significant Court Decisions: Fire Insurance - Arson or Fraud as
Defense, 22 DEF. L.J. 205, 211 (1973) ("When the investigation by the fire department indicates the fire was intentionally set, suspicion may naturally focus on the insured.").
139. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Hickman v. London Assurance Corp. 159 P. 45, 47 (Cal. 1920); Dyno-Bite, Inc. v. Travelers Cos.,
439 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Gross v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 337
N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972); Restina v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 306
N.Y.S.2d 219, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
140. Restina, 735 F. Supp. at 222.
141. Dyno-Bite, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61; see also U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Wigginton, 964 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1992) (insured's offer to take an examination under oath
three months after request and conditioned on the company agreeing to waive its rights with
respect to voiding the policy was unreasonable); Pervis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
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this view may appear harsh to the insured, the courts are following
the wording of the contract. In fact, it is the insured who uses the

language of the insurance policy to justify recovery of his loss. The
insured cannot invoke, part of the contract, while ignoring other sections of the policy which are not to his benefit." 2
A still more fundamental argument of both plaintiffs and defendants concerns whether Fifth Amendment guarantees may be asserted at all during examinations under oath. The Fifth Amendment,
in relevant part, provides that "no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 1 4 3 It has long been
held that this prohibition permits a person to refuse to testify against
himself at a criminal trial.14 4 Additionally, Fifth Amendment principles apply in any civil proceedings where the information sought
5
might incriminate the witness in future criminal proceedings."1
Therefore, the government can not compel the testimony of a witness
at a civil proceeding just as it can not compel the testimony of a
defendant at a criminal trial." 6 Given the reasons for the invocation
and application of the Fifth Amendment, courts then turn to consideration of constitutional guarantees during examinations of the
insured.
The leading case on this issue is Hickman v. London Assurance
Co.1 4 7 In categorically mandating that the protection afforded by the

Fifth Amendment has no application to insurance examinations, the
court reasoned:
The [state] compulsion secured against by the constitution is a
901 F.2d 944, 948 (11 th Cir. 1990) (the insured's offer to submit to an examination under
oath was too far removed from the date the loss occurred), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 255 (1990);
Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 428
N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), afid, 53 N.Y.2d 835, 422 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y.
1981) (the insured's compliance with the insurer's subsequent demand for an examination
before trial did not cure the insured's contractual default in failing to submit to an examination under oath).
142. The court in Hickman noted that an insured must be held to all language contained
in the policy:
If the insured cannot bring himself within the terms and conditions of the policy,
he cannot recover. The terms of the policy constitute the measure of the insurer's liability. If it appears that the contract has been violated, and terminated
by the assured, he cannot recover. [The insured] seeks to recover by reason of a
contract, and he must show that he has complied with such contract on his part.
Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 195 P. 45, 50 (Cal. 1920) (quoting Bastian v. British
Am. Assurance Co., 77 P. 63, 66 (Cal. 1904)).
143. U.S. CONST. amend V.
144. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
145. Id.
146. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
147. 195 P. 45 (Cal. 1920).
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compulsion exercised by the state in a sovereign capacity in
some manner known to law. Constitutional immunity has no application to a private examination arising out of a contractual
relationship. The examination to which appellants demanded respondent should submit was an extra judicial proceeding, not
authorized by any constitutional or statutory provision, but
purely by virtue of a contract between the parties.
To bring a case within the constitutional immunity it mus t appear
that compulsion was sought under public process of some kind.14 8
Hence, the court ruled that the policyholder could not recover in an
action against the insurer for it's refusal to honor the insured's claim
on the basis of violation of the cooperation clause of the insurance,
policy.14 9
The analysis in Hickman has been favorably recognized, and in
many courts explicitly adopted, when faced with similar Fifth
Amendment issues. 5 ' Specifically, a United States District Court
has noted that an insured incorrectly seeks to utilize the Fifth
Amendment privilege not only as a shield, but as a sword when the
insured brings an action for an insurer's failure to honor their claim
based on breach of the. cooperation clause. 51 There appears to be
little justification for the insured's position. Current standards in the
insurance industry, however, have led to a revival of the Fifth
Amendment argument by insureds.
For example, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 5 2 the insured argued that in light of state regulation of the insurance industry, mandating the use of cooperation clauses in insurance contracts creates
the requisite state action that is necessary to find government compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. 153 The Longwell court refuted
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id. The court went on to add:
The demand was made upon him by virtue of a stipulation in the contract and
by the stipulation alone must his refusal be judged. The stipulation constitutes a
promissory warranty . . . and the performance of such stipulation was a condition precedent to any right of action . . . The respondent did not fulfill his obligation and-stands here as having recovered a judgement upon an express contract one of the conditions of which he failed to perform; in other words, when
he commenced this suit he was without a cause of action.
Id.
150. See Warrilow v. Superior Court of Arizona, 689 P.2d 193, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Restina v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 219, 233 (1969).
151. Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141, 149 (W.D. Wis. 1968); see
also Pervis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 1990); Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo.
1955).
152. 735 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
153. Id. at 1194. Longwell tried to distinguish his case from Hickman and other cases
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the insured's contention by stating: "The mere fact that the state has
mandated that certain provisions appear in the policy, which are protective of both the insured and the insurer does not mean that the
policy is somehow transformed into anything other than a private
contractual relationship." 154 The court supported its conclusion by
remarking that the first page of the standard policy clearly creates a
private contractual 56relationship, 5 and that Longwell freely entered
1
into that contract.
The Longwell decision again illustrates the reluctance of the
courts to interpret insurance policies outside the specific language of
the policy itself. Although states have regulated provisions contained
in insurance policies, the government has not intruded into the contractual relationship between the parties. The existence of government regulation in insurance policies does not necessitate government involvement in private examinations under oath between the
insureds and insurers. However, government attempts to increase
control over the actions of insurers, as when arson is suspected, present a more compelling argument for the insureds.
Nearly all states have provisions that require an insurer who
suspects arson to report that suspicion and other relevant information to a law enforcement entity, generally the fire marshall.157 Consider an excerpt from Pennsylvania's Arson Insurance Reporting Immunity Act, which contains language similar to that of other state
statutes:
Any authorized agency may, in writing, require any insurance
company at interest to release to the requesting authorized
agency any or all relevant information or evidence deemed important to the authorized agency which the insurance company
may have in it's possession relating to a fire loss under investigation by the agency.1 58
with similar circumstances. Although the court acknowledged that the examination provision
was not part of the standard form policy mandated by state statute, the court's opinion did not
discuss whether the legislation implicated the self incrimination privilege.
154. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. at 1194.
155. The policy provided that the insurer agrees to insure the insured "in consideration
of the provisions and stipulations herein or added hereto and of
dollars premium." Id.
at 1194 (quoting Standard New York insurance policy).
156. Id. Longwell was not compelled to be a party to such contract, he voluntarily entered into the contractual relationship without any coercion by Allstate or the State of New
York. Id.
157. Michael E. Brown, Statutory Immunity: Fact or Fiction? 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 849
(1988). The author points out that only four states, Michigan, South Carolina, Wisconsin and
Mississippi have provisions in which the insurer is not obligated to divulge incriminating information to the authorities. Id. at 849.
158. Arson Reporting Immunity Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1610.1 (1980).
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In addition, many statutes allow for the imposition of sanctions if the
insurance company fails to comply 8 9 and provide for limited or absolute immunity of insurers from liability arising out of any action
with respect to the release of such information. 160 In the case of Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., 6 ' a United States District Court
in New Jersey determined that the existence of standard fire policy
statutes and arson reporting laws elevated the circumstances surrounding the examination under oath to a level which permitted insureds to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights.
The court premised its ruling on the assertion that a fire insurance policy is a contract of adhesion.1 62 The court acknowledged that
the fire policy at issue was in part legislatively circumscribed. However, the court stressed that "the statutes do not prevent a carrier
from offering a more favorable provision. [I]t is correct to say that
the carrier offers its provisions on a take it or leave it basis."16 Relying on this interpretation, the court read the policy to accord with
the reasonable expectations of the purchaser so far as the language
will permit."' Thus, the court noted the apparent unfairness to the
insured in this situation: "To say that the oral examination provisions of a standard fire insurance policy are in any sense bargained
for is . . . simply fictional. Rather than operating under any set of
bargained for contractual terms, the parties operate under a series of
rules prescribed by the state." 6 5 The court then reasoned that given
the clearly nonconsensual nature of the policy, 'the insured's obligation to submit to an examination can not be fairly described as a
contractual one. 66 The court further offered a forceful ruling:
To the extent that the insureds obligation to respond is not truly
contractual, the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment
159. Pennsylvania's Arson Reporting Immunity Act declares that failure.of any person
or entity to comply with the provisions set forth shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. Id.
160. Brown, supra note 157, at 849.
161. No. CIV.A.84-4025, 1986 WL 1706 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1986).
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id. at *4 (citing Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 874
(N.J. 1968)); see also Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 222 (Conn.
1988) ("Standardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of contracts of
adhesion, whose most salient feature is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining
processes of ordinary contracts." (citations omitted)); Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d
123, 125 (Alaska 1984) ("Insurance policies may be considered contracts of adhesion due to
the inequality of bargaining power.").
164. Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.84-4025, 1986 WL 1706, at *4
(D. N.J. Feb. 6, 1986).
165. Id. at *7.
166. Id. at *8.
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are applicable, just as they would be in the case of a party declining to respond to discovery on Fifth Amendment grounds.
The compulsory aspect of these circumstances is even more accentuated by the fact that the state's arson reporting law effectively makes the state and the insurer partners in the business
of
617
gathering information regarding possible acts of arson.
The Yannitsadis court did not address the implications of its
decision on an insurer's right to ascertain the truth regarding an insured's claim. The court did note that the insured may not refuse to
submit to an examination under oath by way of the Fifth Amendment,1 1 8 but may invoke the Fifth Amendment only in regards to
specific questions which could, if answered, incriminate the
insured. 169
A recent case also suggests that courts may begin to view examinations under oath differently when considering state arson reporting acts. In Weathers v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,'7 the
court reached a conclusion similar to Yannitsadis. In Weathers, the
insured's home was extensively damaged by fire.17 1 Because there
was evidence of arson, the insurer requested to examine the insured.17 ' At the time of the examination, the insurer and the state
fire marshal's office were exchanging information concerning the fire
pursuant to the Kansas Arson Immunity Act.173 On advice of her
attorney, the insured refused to answer specific questions as to the
cause and origin of the fire."7 4
The court considered whether the insured could invoke the Fifth
Amendment during the examination. The court emphatically answered in the affirmative:
[T]he court has no doubt that any information revealed to [the
insurer] during the examination under oath would have in turn
been given to the state for later use against plaintiff at her crim167. Id. The court distinguished cases cited by the insurance company, such as Hickman, because the court found that the insurance policy under scrutiny in the case at bar was in
no way bargained for between the parties. The Yannitsadis court's ruling differs from previous
cases in which the courts have refused to apply Fifth Amendment principal to examinations
under bath.
168. Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.84-4025, 1986 WL 1706, at *9
(D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1986) ("It- is true that the fifth amendment does not give a party to a civil
proceeding license to refuse to answer questions in a blanket fashion.").
169. Id.
170. 793 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Kan. 1992).
171. Weathers v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (D. Kan.
1992).
172. Id.at 1021.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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inal trial. For [the insurer] to assert that plaintiff's . ..Fifth

Amendment rights were not operable at their examination under
oath is absurd. If [the insurer's] argument has merit, then an
insured in the plaintiff's position would have to choose between
possibly breaching her insurance contract and forfeiting her benefits thereunder or revealing critical information to state authorities which could be used against her in a criminal prosecution.
Such a position is simply unacceptable and offensive to constitutional sensibilities.1" 5
Importantly, the Weathers court considered previous court rulings that stressed that Fifth Amendment rights could not be invoked
in private contractual settings. The court noted that none of those
cases discussed the effect of an arson reporting immunity act upon
an insured's duty to submit to an examination under oath.17
The Yannitsadis and Weathers courts determined that compulsion of an insured's testimony would occur if an insured forfeited his
177
rights under the policy after refusing to answer certain questions.
It has been recognized that economic coercion can justify the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights. 178 If an insured's rights are abated,
as many courts hold, rather than forfeited, the insured is still left
with the opportunity of later bringing suit on the policy.179 Thus, the
insurer would have a stronger argument for denying the insured's
claim. If the reasoning in Weathers and Yannitsadis is adopted by
other courts, however, the effectiveness of examinations under oath
to discourage fraud would be curtailed.
While those courts found authority for their holdings by narrowly construing the contents of the insurance policy, an equally persuasive contrary argument can be found in United States v. Moeller.18 0 Although the court did not address the implication of a state
arson reporting law, the difference is inconsequential given the analysis set forth by the court.
175. Id. at 1022.
176. Weathers v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 1002, 1022 (D. Kan.
1992).
177. Id.
178. Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975).
179. See Commonwealth v. Ball, 565 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S.
1046 (1990). The court stated:
Nor are we persuaded that any coercion, properly understood, took place [during
the examination]. Attorney Henry's warning was that "failure to respond may in
and of itself be considered a material breach of the policy of insurance." That
hardly amounts to coercion. [lInsureds could have insisted on awaiting the outcome of any criminal action before making statements in a civil proceeding.

Id.
180.

402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
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The Moeller court noted several reasons for finding that state
compulsion can not be a byproduct of a standard property insurance
statute. First, the court noted that Connecticut's standard fire policy
insurance requirements do not compel the insurer to conduct an examination at all, thus mitigating the state coercion proposition set
forth by the insured.18 1 Second, the statute does not require the insured to answer any questions. "If [an insured] refuses to testify, the
state has no power to compel answers, nor does it have the power to
impose adverse consequences. "182 It is the insurance company, not
the state which makes the determination whether to assert that the
condition of cooperation has been breached. Third, the court stated
that legislation merely authorizes a private entity to do exactly what
it is already entitled to do.1 83 The purpose of the legislation is to
achieve uniformity in insurance policy provisions and not to aid
184
criminal investigations.
Thus, absent direct interaction with the authorities, the insurer
is not acting as an agent of the state when it conducts an examination under oath. 8 5 Although a jurisdiction may have an arson reporting statute, the insurer acts within the context of the private insurance contract. Only after an insurer uncovers criminal
information may the state compel an insurer to produce the evidence
for the authorities.
The Weathers and Yannitsadis rulings are novel. The purpose
behind examinations under oath, however, remains strong and public
policy warrants effective detection and disclosure of fraudulent insurance claims precipitated by criminal activity. Courts faced with
circumstances similar to the Weathers and Yannitsadis cases might
181. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D. Conn. 1975); see also State v.
Hovrud 805 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (standard fire policy that permitted examinations under oath, which had been approved by the State Insurance Commissioner, did not
make the oath "required or authorized by state law"), review denied 815 P.2d 265 (Wash.
1991).
182. Id.
183. Id. The Moeller court added: "It is true that the statute requires the insurer to
adopt the standard form policy, but the provisions of that policy authorize and do not require
the insurer to examine the insured." Id.
184. The Moeller court noted that the outcome would be different if the statute required
that upon every presentation of a claim of loss, the insurer must question the insured, and that
upon the insured's refusal to answer any questions that insurer must refuse to pay benefits. Id.
185. For example, in People v. Mangiefico, 102 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453-54 (Ct. App. 1972),
the court held that since the insurance investigator was an agent of the insurer, rather than the
state, he was not required to advise insured of his rights before conducting the examination.
The court found the extent of the insurer's involvement with the authorities prior to the examination was important: "There is no indication in the record that local enforcement authorities
made any requests of [the investigator] during the course of his investigation or that they
directed him in any way as to the extent or conduct of his investigation." Id.
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reach a different conclusion based on the compelling interests which
insurance companies and the public have for maximum utilization of
examinations under oath.
V.

Conclusion

When a loss claim is filed, the insurer must rely upon the insured for information regarding the loss. Because of the reliance
upon the insured's statements, it is fair to allow the insurer to compel an insured to submit to an examination under oath to verify the
validity of his claim. Many insureds, however, have attempted to
curtail the scope of the examination by challenging the insurer's
right to conduct a complete examination.
The insurance policy mandates the cooperation of the insured in
an insurer's determination of the sufficiency of the claim. By aiding
in the desire for factual information, separate examinations of multiple insureds should be recognized as a harmless and necessary practice by insurers. Furthermore, invocation of Fifth Amendment principles during the examination process defeats the examination's
purpose of expediting the evaluation of the insured's claim.
Resolution of these controversies should coincide with increased
usage of examinations. The insurer and the public share a common
interest in the detection of fraudulent insurance claims. The examination under oath advances important public policies and should be
recognized as an efficient way of ensuring that controversies are resolved thoroughly and quickly. Recognition of the value of an examination under oath should persuade insurers to call for their increased
use in claims adjustment.
Michael A. Hamilton

